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Abstract
In the recent years Intelligent Transportation Systems and associated technologies have progressed significantly, including services 
based on wireless communications between vehicles (V2V) and infrastructure (V2I). In order to increase the trustworthiness of 
these communications, and convince drivers to adopt the new technologies, specific security and privacy requirements need to be 
addressed, using Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). To maintain VANET′s security and eliminate possible attacks, mechanisms 
are to be developed. In this paper, previous researches are reviewed aiming to provide information concerning matches between an 
attack and a solution in a VANET environment.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS), 
also known as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I), and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) 
communications, utilize technologies that allow inter-ve-
hicle communication, exchanging information with road-
side infrastructure and with other road users. C-ITS deal 
with transportation issues, improves road safety by con-
tributing to reduced number of accidents, decreased con-
gestion, improved handling of the travel demand, support-
ing eco-friendly choices of transportation and optimal use 
of the already existing capacity of transport networks.
The main concern about these communications is the 
trustworthiness and integrity of the information provided, 
in order to verify the authenticity of the messages, and the 
confidentiality of the data, to ensure that measurements 
made by a sensor are not intercepted by a third party. 
Securing mechanisms are developed to protect users’ pri-
vacy, as a privacy violation can discourage users from 
adopting this new technology.
VANET is a security framework concerning V2V, 
V2I and hybrid communications, created by applying the 
principles of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), and 
includes On-Board Units (OBUs) and Road Side Units 
(RSUs) (Sucasas et al., 2016). On Board Units (OBU) 
are installed on vehicles and operate on a principle of 
Dedicated Short Radio Communications (DSRC). They 
consist of sensors that collect, process and exchange data 
via channels (Durech et al., 2016; Monteuuis et al., 2017). 
Road-Side Units (RSU) are mostly located at intersections 
and their operation extents the telecommunication oper-
ation by providing additional data packages to the driv-
ers (Durech et al., 2016; Monteuuis et al., 2017). In the 
near future more vehicles are expected to be equipped 
with OBUs, and more RSUs will be deployed, enhancing 
V2V and V2I communication. Moreover, every vehicle 
in VANET should be equipped with a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) or a Differential Global Positioning System 
(DGPS) receiver, in order to precise its location (Durech 
et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2004).
Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication is the exchange of 
data between two or more vehicles without the support 
of RSUs (Monteuuis et al., 2017). V2V communication 
includes the exchange of collision warning messages, 
road obstacle warning, cooperative driving, intersection 
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collision warning, and lane modification assistance 
(Durech et al., 2016). The most common message is the 
Basic Safety Message (BSM). A BSM contains informa-
tion about the state of the vehicle, such as acceleration, 
speed, position, brake system status and transmits it mul-
tiple times per second (Jae and Seng., 2016). V2I is the 
exchange of information between vehicles and infrastruc-
ture (Monteuuis et al., 2017), and are responsible for traf-
fic monitoring.
Following the introduction, the paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 refers to security and privacy require-
ments that need to be addressed; Section 3 lists the attacks 
and challenges in VANET; Section 4 suggests security 
and privacy preserving mechanisms; Section 5 proposes 
solutions to the attacks and challenges and Section 6 con-
cludes this paper.
2 Security and privacy requirements
To guarantee the success of VANET, it is important to list the 
security and privacy requirements that need to be addressed. 
Security requirements increase the security of processing 
and data exchange, while privacy requirements increase the 
trustworthiness between the system and the traders with the 
system. The studies reported in (Jae and Seng, 2016; Sucasas 
et al., 2016; Hasrouny et al., 2017; Agarwal, 2017; Asuquo et 
al., 2018) investigate and establish them in detail.
2.1 Security requirements
1. Authentication. Receivers accept messages only by 
legitimate senders, in order to protect the system 
from malicious users and false data (Agarwal, 2017). 
An authenticated origin is verified by certificates 
and pseudonyms (Hasrouny et al., 2017).
2. Confidentiality. Confidentiality is a set of rules aim-
ing to limit access on certain resources by unautho-
rized users (Hasrouny et al., 2017), and protect data 
from eavesdroppers. Confidentiality mainly uses 
encryption techniques based on secure key manage-
ment system (Agarwal, 2017).
3. Traceability and Revocability. For security reasons, 
real identity of the vehicles must stay hidden from 
third parties, but at the same time must be traceable 
from specific authorities, in order to revoke them in 
case of misbehavior (Hasrouny et al., 2017). A Trust 
Authority keeps a revocation list including those 
OBUs cannot be trusted.
4. Efficiency. The computational overhead should be 
decreased to keep low channel delays and ensure 
high efficiency of the scheme (Hasrouny et al., 2017).
2.2 Privacy requirements
1. Short-term linkability. When an OBU provides two 
or more data packages in a short period of time δt, 
the receivers should be able to link the massages with 
the source in order to address the risk of Sybil attack.
2. Long-term unlinkability. The messages transmitted 
cannot be linked with the originator's identity, so sen-
sitive information such as sender's location, direction 
etc., remain hidden, ensuring drivers' privacy.
3. Forward unlinkability. After a vehicle is included 
in TA's revocation list, its future messages are still 
untraceable (Sucasas et al., 2016).
4. Anonymity. Anonymity is used to preserve users' 
identity and actions hidden from third-parties. It is 
usually achieved with pseudo-anonymous identities 
(Hasrouny et al., 2017).
5. Pseudonymity. Privacy and anonymity is achieved 
with pseudo-identities, temporary and anonymous 
keys, giving drivers' the opportunity to access cer-
tain services, while staying untraceable. A Trusted 
Third-Party, usually the CA, is the only authority that 
can link every pseudonym with the real identity and 
in case of misbehaving revoke the malicious vehicle.
6. Accountability - Non-reputation. Entities cannot 
deny any previous or current message transmission 
(Monteuuis et al., 2017).
7. Location Privacy. All information concerning vehi-
cles' trajectories, present or past location, points of 
interest etc., must be protected from other entities 
(Asuquo et al., 2018).
3 Attacks and challenges
Before adopting any security architecture, such as VANET, 
one must acknowledge the risks associated with message 
transmission via wireless communications. Several studies 
investigated the risks of VANET (Raw et al., 2013; Samara 
et al., 2010; Chauley, 2016; Lim and Manivannan, 2016; van 
der Heijden, 2010; Dak et al., 2012; Hasrouny et al., 2017).
Authors in (Hasrouny et al., 2017), suggest four main 
attack categories:
1. Wireless interface, including:
• Location Tracking. The attacker outlines driver's 
characteristics and tracks his/hers location.
• Denial of Service (DoS). The attacker disrupts or 
overloads the communication channel by trans-
mitting high numbers of messages.
• Sybil Attack. The attacker impersonates as mul-
tiple vehicles, sending the same message, com-
monly resulting in road traffic.
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• Malware. The attacker sends spam messages to 
overload the communication connection, causing 
delays and consuming network bandwidth.
• Man in the Middle (MiM). The attacker invades 
the communication of two vehicles, impersonal-
izing each one of them to alternate the message 
content. 
• Brute force Attack. The attacker obtains sensi-
tive information including passwords, identifica-
tion numbers, cracks encrypted data, or tests net-
work security.
• Black Hole Attack. The attacker intercepts or 
retains the data packet, transmitting it delayed or 
at another location.
2. Hardware and software, including:
• Injection of erroneous messages (bogus info). The 
attacker intentionally transmits false messages.
• Message Suppression or Alteration. The attacker 
changes message content.
• Usurpation of the identity of a node (Spoofing 
or Impersonation or Masquerade). The attacker 
impersonalizes another vehicle.
• Tampering Hardware. The attacker tries to get or 
put special data in the network.
• Routing Attack. The attacker drops a data packet 
or disrupts the routing.
• Cheating with position info (GPS spoofing) and 
Tunneling attack. The attacker generates false 
position information.
• Timing attack. The attacker adds timeslots, cre-
ating delays. 
• Replay attack. The attacker sends previously gen-
erated messages in new connections.
3. Sensors input in vehicles, including:
• Illusion attack. The attacker deceives vehicles' 
sensors, causing incorrect sensors' readings and 
false warning messages.
• Jamming attack. The attacker violates VANET's 
radio frequencies. 
4. Threats to infrastructure, including:
• Unauthorized access. The attacker accesses the 
network without permission, spying the transmit-
ted data.
• Session hijacking. The attacker controls the ses-
sion between nodes.
• Reputation (loss of event traceability). The 
attacker causes denial of communication.
4 Security and privacy preserving mechanisms
Many mechanisms are developed to achieve security 
and privacy in vehicular communications and to ensure 
the trustworthiness of the system and the authentication 
of the messages transmitted. The proposed security 
architectures address the necessities and potential risks 
involved in VANET environment and specifies when 
and where to apply security controls. Authors in (Jae 
and Seng, 2016; Sucasas et al., 2016; Durech et al., 2016; 
Monteuuis et al., 2017; Rigazzi et al., 2017; Hasrouny et 
al., 2017; Asuquo et al., 2018), suggest multiple schemes 
and their constituent parts.
1. Anonymous Certificates. Transmitted messages are 
signed with anonymous certificates, issued by the 
Certificate Authority (CA), preserving the real iden-
tity of the origin. CA is the only entity that tracks 
vehicles via serial numbers, matches them with the 
anonymous certificates and revokes them in cases 
of misbehaving. The disadvantage of the procedure 
is the efficiency reduction of the revocation mecha-
nism, and the scalability problem caused by the high 
communication frequency between vehicles and CA 
(Raya and Hubaux 2005).
2. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). PKI consists of:
• Certificate Authority (CA), authenticates vehicles, 
issues digital certificates and provides vehicles 
with public/secret key pairs to sign their messages 
(Raya and Hubaux 2005). The private key is used 
to sign an outgoing message, while the public key 
is used by the receiver to verify the trustworthi-
ness of the sender. CA is also responsible for the 
revocation mechanism in case of misbehaving or 
corrupted entities. 
• Certificate Revocation List (CRL), includes 
the revoked certificates cannot be trusted. The 
receivers accept data packets after checking if 
the corresponding certificate is not published in 
the CRL, or else deny them (Raya et al., 2006; 
Rigazzi et al., 2017).
• Root CA, a trusted party, authenticates entities' 
identities (Hasrouny et al., 2017).
• Registration Authority (RA) or Enrollment 
Authority (EA), certified by the Root CA, issues 
certificates, and protects Root CA from attackers. 
RA activates or initializes OBUs. Only when a 
vehicle holds the enrollment certificate, is able to 
request pseudonym certificates (Jae and Seng, 2016).
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• Certificate database, includes issued and revoked 
certificates.
• Certificate store, located on each vehicle, stores 
issued certificates and private keys.
The disadvantage of PKI architecture is the scalability 
problem, as research is required to recover the keys.
3. Pseudonym/Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure 
(PPKI/VPKI) (Rigazzi et al., 2017; Jae and Seng, 
2016). PPKI or VPKI is a PKI architecture scheme 
with the additional security authority concerning 
traceability. Vehicles' real identity is replaced by 
pseudo-identities, thus creating a Pseudonym or else 
Vehicular PKI. PPKI/VPKI includes:
• Root CA, responsible for the Long Term 
Certification Authority and the Pseudonym 
Certification Authority. 
• Pseudonym CA (PCA), which issues pseudonyms 
and CRLs to registered vehicles.
This approach suggests that every vehicle, owns a pair 
of public/private key and short-term certificates including 
some pseudonyms. After a small period of time the pseud-
onyms expire and the vehicles communicate with the PCA 
to renew them, resulting in communication overhead.
4. Group Signature Schemes. The members of a group 
have several private keys, but share only one pub-
lic key. A receiver acknowledges the group's signa-
ture, but at the same time the identity of the sender 
is undistinguished. Group signature may replace the 
large volume of pseudonym certificates, but causes 
computational problems (Sucasas et al., 2016). 
5. Clustering cooperative approach. Vehicles orga-
nize in groups with a group leader, responsible for 
gathering and delivering message packages, jeopar-
dizing his privacy in order to maintain other group 
members' identity hidden. The disadvantage of the 
scheme is that the group leader sacrifices his privacy 
(Sucasas et al., 2016).
6. Pseudo-identity scheme. Vehicles are equipped with 
a pseudonym and a secret key, issued by the Trust 
Authority (TA). A receiver accepts messages after 
the verification of the public parameters of the TA. 
Vehicles only contact the TA to renew their pseud-
onyms periodically, to avoid traceability. The TA 
should not provide a large set of pseudonyms to the 
vehicles, in order to keep the revocation mechanism 
efficient in case of misbehavior, but also should not pro-
vide a small set of pseudonym, in order to avoid com-
munication overhead between vehicles-TA, achieving 
autonomy of the system. TA is the only participated 
authority, responsible for the credential generation, 
credential distribution, misbehavior detection, and 
anonymity revocation. It is the only party that can link 
the serial number of the OBUs with the credentials 
and track the vehicles. The revocation event occurs 
after reporting and investigating possibly misbehav-
ing or malicious vehicles. A transmitted message is 
signed with the private key and bears the pseudo-iden-
tity, securing the issue of anonymity. Only the TA can 
link a pseudo-identity to the real identity/ serial num-
ber of an OBU (Sucasas et al., 2016).
7. Digital signature scheme. Every vehicle is provided 
with a pair of long-term, cryptographic keys, one 
secret and one public. The CA issues a long-term 
certificate for the public key. Vehicles' Hardware 
Security Module (HSM) is responsible for stor-
ing the secret keys, generating digital signatures 
and managing the cryptographic keys' operations. 
Digital signature schemes use the pseudo-anony-
mous identification, in order to protect the real iden-
tity of the vehicles. To create a pseudonym, a vehicle 
first sends the public key to the CA, via secure chan-
nel, and then the CA signs the public key and gener-
ates a set of pseudonyms for each vehicle. When a 
pseudonym change occurs, the vehicle can no lon-
ger utilize the past pseudonym. The frequency of 
the pseudonym change depends on the security level 
needed (Durech et al., 2016).
To transmit a message, the sender uses its secret key 
to create a digital signature. In this way a cryptographic 
number is created. Cryptographic number, attached to the 
message and the certificate, which is connected with the 
public key, are send to the receiver vehicle. The receiver 
validates the certificate and the digital signature attached 
to the message, using its public key. 
5 Proposed solutions to the attacks and challenges
5.1 Complete PKI communication
In PKI vehicles need to communicate frequently with the 
appropriate entities responsible for registration, pseud-
onym and digital certificates, public/private keys and 
revocation mechanisms.
Authors in (Monteuuis et al., 2017), suggest the 
SCOOP@F PKI protocol to achieve complete end-to-end 
communication between vehicles and PKI entities. Its 
constituent parts are:
• Root CA (RCA), a trusted party responsible for 
the Long Term Certification Authority and the 
Pseudonym Certification Authority.
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• The Long Term Certification Authority (LTCA), 
issues Long Term Certificates (LTC), validates the 
Pseudonym Certificates, having the role of a secu-
rity manager.
• The Pseudonym Certification Authority (PCA), 
responsible for the delivering, the monitoring and 
the use of Pseudonym Certificates.
• The Distribution Center (DC), responsible for the 
update of trust information, such as the Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL).
• The LifeCycle Management Center and the 
Manufacturer, responsible for vehicles' registration 
within the LTCA and vehicles' connection with a 
PKI certification authority.
PKI security mechanism constitutes from request and 
responses between vehicles-PKI entities, aiming to pro-
vide certificates. This type of communication includes the 
following stages:
• Initialization. The manufacturer generates a pair of 
public and private key to ensure sender's authentica-
tion, associates the public key with a unique identity, 
sends a registration request, and finally the LTCA 
accepts the request and add it to the database.
• Long Term Certificate (LTC) request and response. 
LTC request is sent to the LTCA.
• Pseudonym Certificate (PC) request and response. 
PC request, attached with the LTC, is sent to the PCA.
• Certificate Revocation List / Trusted Service Status 
List (TSL) request and response. CRL includes those 
certificates that are revoked and shall not be trusted, 
and the Trusted Service Status List (TSL) includes 
those certificate authorities that can be trusted. A 
vehicle may obtain these lists, by sending CLR and 
TSL requests to the Distribution Center. 
5.2 Communication overhead elimination
As mentioned in Section 4, in PPKI/VPKI approach every 
vehicle owns a pair of public/private keys, short-term cer-
tificates and some pseudonyms. When the pseudonyms 
expire, vehicles communicate with the PCA to renew them.
In (Rigazzi et al., 2017), a method to minimize the fre-
quency of the communication and reduce the results of 
the communication overhead, with a Bloom Filter com-
pression is suggested. A bloom filter is a probabilistic data 
structure used to test whether an element is a member of 
a set. There are two possible matches, false positives and 
false negatives, representing the probability of "possibly 
in set" or "definitely not in set".
In standard CRL the certificates are identified with an 
ID and an optional expiry date field, while in Compressed 
CRL (C2RL) a single Bloom filter of fixed size is carried 
by the entries field, succeeding in remaining the size con-
stant as the number of revoked certificates increases.
The CRL size decreases the amount of data dissemi-
nated causing computational problems. CRL's overhead 
could be eliminated with the use of the bloom filter com-
pression, resulting in Compressed Certificate Revocation 
List (C2RL) (Rigazzi et al., 2017).
C2RLs are issued by the RCA and delivered to the con-
nected PCA. The PCA sends the C2RL to the RSUs, which 
validate the attached signature. RSUs sign the C2RL, and 
then it transmits to the connected vehicles, verifying the 
authenticity. In this way, malicious vehicles can be eas-
ily tracked, by checking if the certificates attached in the 
messages are contained in the filter transmitted in the lat-
est C2RL (Rigazzi et al., 2017).
5.3 Location privacy preserving
Researchers in (Asuquo et al., 2018), establish two privacy 
preserving authentication schemes that address location 
privacy in vehicular network:
• Symmetric Key Authentication Schemes (SKAS). In 
SKAS, a single cryptography key is used by both the 
sender and the receiver in the process of the encryp-
tion, to achieve message authentication. Receivers 
use their key to verify the messages transmitted.
• Asymmetric Key Authentication Schemes (AKAS). 
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) or digital signa-
tures are utilized for signing and message verifica-
tion. A public key is used for message encryption 
and a private one for decryption. AKAS can be either 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based or Identity 
(ID)-based authentication. ID-based authentication, 
which depends on ID-based crypto-systems, the real 
identity of vehicles is used to sign and verify digital 
signatures, reducing communication overheads and 
simplifying the process of managing certificates.
5.4 Attacks solutions
Attacks and challenges listed in Section 3, encounter with 
many security controls, and mostly with security and pri-
vacy mechanism analyzed in Section 4.
1. Wireless Interface. To eliminate wireless inter-
face risks, it is of primary importance to secure 
OBUs location and identity. Pseudonyms, anony-
mous changing keys or group signature are mainly 
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used. Digital certificates and signatures in associa-
tion with confidential key communication and short-
lived changing keys are used to resist to Man in the 
Middle, Malware and Spamming, and DoS attacks. 
Sybil attacks may be encountered with temporary 
certificates, PKIs, anonymous certifications, and 
pseudo-identity mechanisms (Hasrouny et al., 2017).
2. Hardware and Software. Group and Digital signa-
ture schemes are the proposed solutions for message 
tampering, message saturation, replay attack, node 
impersonation, masquerading, and routing attacks. 
Researchers recommend VPKI, group communi-
cations use for Spoofing and Forgery attack. The 
majority of the attacks could be abated with time 
stamping techniques and cryptographic certificates, 
symmetric cryptography and authenticated identi-
ties (Hasrouny et al., 2017).
3. Sensors input in vehicles. Jamming attack is sur-
passed by switching transmission channel  or switch-
ing between different wireless technologies, while 
for GPS Spoofing, Faking Position or Illustration 
attack, digital signature with positioning system is 
suggested (Hasrouny et al., 2017). 
4. Threats to infrastructure. For unauthorized access 
CRL's digital certificates, certified and disposable 
keys are used. Moreover, to preclude traceability, 
authenticated and verified sensors, or audit logs, 
remote activation and deactivation of nodes are pro-
posed (Hasrouny et al., 2017). 
6 Conclusion
In this paper, a literature review about the recent develop-
ments on secure V2V and V2I communication has been 
presented. The paper discusses the current architecture 
mechanisms that can be used to enhance the trustworthi-
ness of the transmitted messages and overcome the dis-
advantages. Several threads concerning VANET security 
framework exist, and additional research needs to be done 
to enhance the robustness of the scheme from potential 
attacks.
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